Against Banning Africa's Unprocessed Mineral Exports
Opposition speech notes from a British Parliamentary round on whether African countries should ban the export of unprocessed mineral ores. They argue that a ban would raise world mineral prices, hurting poor consumers and climate goals worldwide, and cut off export revenue that African governments need for debt, budgets, technology imports and infrastructure. The notes then weigh both sides on scale, certainty and timeframe.
- Author
- Chris Hu
- Side:
- Opposition
- Length
- 7 min read
Motion
This House Believes That African countries should ban the export of unprocessed mineral ores.
Case notes. These are working notes prepared for a debate round rather than a finished essay.
Editor's note: OG = Opening Government, OO = Opening Opposition (British Parliamentary format). The original notes also contain empty headings for other teams (OG: “Developing internally”; OO) and a closing list of positions (“OG, CO, CG, OO.”), which are omitted here. Spelling, grammar and typing errors have been corrected and headings formatted for the web; words in square brackets are editorial.
Argument 1: Everyone in the world suffers if Africa bans exports
This isn’t an actor's motion from the perspective of African countries. The extension idea is very simple. African mineral exports are inputs into global supply chains. Restricting those exports raises the world price of critical minerals, which then raises the price of thousands of downstream goods consumed by billions of people. Why does price rise:
- If Africa no longer sells raw ore into global markets, the number of tonnes available to foreign refiners falls. Demand for lithium and nickel does not fall at the same speed, so the world price rises.
- Government’s whole case assumes processing will now happen inside Africa, but those processes happen incredibly slowly. So there would be an interim period of a decade of time where the supply simply is non existent.
- Economies of Scales: Large existing refineries process ore from many countries in one giant plant. That gives them lower average costs. If production is fragmented into many smaller national processing facilities, you scale economies.
This matters because minerals are not luxury goods but are upstream inputs to other goods mentioned by OG themselves, things like batteries, electricity grids, and phones and cars. These are everything we use in daily lives. So even a relatively small increase in the price of copper, cobalt, lithium, nickel, etc. can propagate through huge parts of the economy. Maybe in the best case from the Gov they expand domestic jobs by 30,000 and thousands of families in Africa are lifted out of poverty, it doesn’t outweigh the billions of consumers globally that suffer a price surge. The aggregate welfare loss is massive.
- Africa supplies 30% of the world’s total mineral, that’s a massive number that even a small reduction of supply means price surge.
- Note the harm of this argument concentrates on poor consumers outside of Africa. A rich German consumer can probably afford a 8% increase in electric car battery, but a consumer in India will be simply priced out. These are real harms because copper and lithium impacts your bus price, electricity bills, and grid storage. It means if you can feel warm in the winter or if you have access to basic transportation.
- There are huge environmental costs. Lithium and minerals are extremely important for batteries, renewable energy grids which help to slow down pollution. If battery costs rise, this means less demand for electric products. Environmental harms like flooding and ecosystem loss are global harms that outweigh African harms.
Argument 2: Cash from mineral export is incredibly important for your economies
Regulations are good
The status quo Opp defends is not zero export control. Most countries in Africa have their own optimized export policy that works best for them. Poorer states like South Sudan rationally export more because they desperately need cash now. But a richer Africa country like Nigeria often has tighter export control because they can couple more money in the supply chain. Governments have incentives to optimize their [sentence unfinished in the original]
- Foreign-currency debt creates a hard annual payment obligation. A lot of sovereign debt is denominated in dollars or euros. Governments cannot repay dollar debt using local currency unless they first obtain foreign exchange. If you don’t have money, you either have to borrow at a far worse rate or go for default.
- This makes you lose your credit score so you can’t borrow in the future. It makes you turn to worst actors such like the IMF, this flips Gov’s case. IMF means austerity measures so everyone starve.
- If borrowers see African countries are restricting their primary ways of making money, they will become more risk averse. This means borrowers will increase interests rates.
- I want to note that revenues from export aren't only concentrated with the price of the goods sold. The majority of revenues which often consists of the majority of GDP in many African countries consist of royalties and license revenues and things like billions and billions of corporate and export tax. This is why most African countries’ entire national budget is heavily linked to mineral export.
- Gov talks about developing your own economy, but the most important thing in developing your own economy is the ability to import goods from other countries via tech transfer. The ways in which you have euros and dollars to import those goods is if you export minerals to get those currencies.
- You need efficient infrastructure required for mineral processing: You need cheap electricity, roads, ports, and a trained labor force. We allow this to happen overtime because export revenues could be used to train a middle class.
Impacts
- A refinery takes years to finance, permit via government bureaucracy, and construction time. During that time, your country doesn't have revenues nor money that you could borrow, this means people will lack capital to access basic food and securities. Welfare programs will be cut to the bare bones. It’s also very hard for you as a gov to hire people to construct those roads for refining because you don’t have money to pay workers sufficiently.
- Political instability: Governments need large cashflow to pay things like pensions and salaries for civil servants. If the size of the salaries on their side shrink even for 2 years, that can trigger massive instability. This is because in a lot of African countries, there are highly diverse ethnic populations in a country and oftentimes borders are drawn arbitrarily meaning that instability can quickly be [galvanized] in ways the government cannot control if people are unhappy.
- Poorer African countries suffer tremendously. Richer states have larger tax bases and can raise revenue elsewhere. In many developing economies, large parts of economic activity are informal and therefore difficult to tax. So countries like Burundi or South Sudan are gonna struggle fiscally tremendously under this policy.
Whip: weighing
Scale
The government protects or develops a subset of African economies and a subset of workers within those economies. We protect everyone in the world from expected values, we win.
Magnitude: we also win on magnitudes
- The harms of my case concentrates on the poorest consumers internationally, this looks like poor Indonesian household or a Latin American worker that’s trying to commute to work.
Speculative and certainty
Gov’s benefits are speculative, they need every chain of domestic diversification to work. They need workers to be effectively trained, government has enough money to enforce those projects, and those projects can work into the long term,
My impact is very straight forward, there is no any causal chain. Simply banning export means people suffer, period.
Timeframe
Diversification might take 5 years or 10 years. Price shocks happen as soon as supply is restricted which happens right after this policy is announced in the public,
Flip
Global harm can undermine development elsewhere. That is to say, yes Africa deserves to develop, but every other country also deserves to develop. If every other country has more expensive electric bills, it’s harder for them to develop.
Also the climate harms is irreversible.
Differentiation from Opening Opposition
OO talks about loans by saying that if you want to industrialize, you will take on bad loans from the IMF. This is true, but I added many more layers of analysis:
- I talked about how you need export revenues to pay off existing debt which can become cyclically bad on their side.
- I talked about tech transfer as the critical transformation for industrialization. That’s only possible through export revenues. This makes us logically prior to OG.
- I actually clarified the scales of why export revenue is important instead of OO’s assertion that most African countries [just] depend entirely on export.
- I gave clearer impacts as to specific Africa countries that are harmed and what programs will be cut on their side. Not abstract austerity measures.
Direct refutation of OG’s claim that Africa themselves capture the values
- Refiners in Africa are not competitive. There’s barely a few players right now cause there isn’t an industry right now. There are few refiners in African countries themselves, it’s a monopoly. If exports are banned and there are only two local refineries, miners have almost no alternative buyers. So it’s not that African countries capture the values, it’s a wealth transfer from miners to refiners in Africa.
- Gov often talks as if “refinery” is one generic thing. But processing lithium, bauxite, copper, cobalt, nickel, etc. requires different tech. So even if local refining is viable for one mineral, that does not mean it is viable for all. This process will take a vast amounts of time, and this time people suffer because there isn’t revenue streams.