Attitudes Before Laws: How Progressive Movements in Developing Countries Should Campaign
An Opposition case on whether progressive movements in developing countries should campaign for legal change or attitudinal change. It argues that changing attitudes is both better (laws follow attitudes and go unenforced without social buy-in) and easier (governments are often corrupt, captured and coalition-bound, while individuals can be persuaded).
- Author
- Chris Hu
- Side:
- Opposition
- Length
- 12 min read
Motion
THBT progressive social movements in developing countries should prioritize campaigning for changes to official laws and governmental policies over changes in mass attitudes and beliefs
Editor's note: Spelling and typing errors have been corrected and headings formatted for the web; words in square brackets are editorial.
Two arguments: first, why changing attitudes is preferable to changing laws in terms of outcome, and second, why changing attitudes is more likely to be feasible than changing laws
First argument: Why is it structurally better to change people’s attitudes towards marginalized communities rather than attempt to change laws?
Framing: this argument operates independent of the clash on which type of change is easier to get, i.e. whether it’s easier to change laws or change attitudes. Assuming both are equally possible, why is it better to change attitudes?
First, laws are a natural extension of public attitudes, which means that discriminatory laws are merely the symptom of regressive attitudes rather than the cause. When an overwhelming majority of people within society hold socially regressive beliefs, governments are elected into power on a mandate of upholding those regressive values, which therefore means that changing attitudes is logically prior to changing laws, because the only way you can meaningfully reform regressive legal codes is by first shifting people’s attitudes about social movements. And importantly, recognize that people’s beliefs are formed independent of state policy: even if the state comes out and says “legalizing gay marriage is good!” or “supporting gender equality is valuable!” that doesn’t change the cultural, religious, and societal norms that have been inculcated into voters throughout the entirety of their lives. This means that changing attitudes is necessary prior to changing laws but also means that any of GOV’s benefits regarding the benefits of legal reform happen on our side too, just without the considerable retaliation and backlash you get on their side when the government is seen as supporting laws that contradict with what the overwhelming majority of people within society view as being the correct form of government
Second, even if you do get substantial legal reform on their side, note that there’s an enforcement problem: maybe governments pass laws that help to protect vulnerable demographics like women or ethnic minorities, but if societal attitudes towards those laws have not also changed due to limited social awareness or advocacy explaining the need for those laws, then laws are likely to be unenforced in three ways: (1) When it comes to negative rights, like the right to not be raped or the right to not be assaulted, there’s likely to be substantial pressure both internally within and externally on police forces to underpolice progressive laws, especially since police chiefs are often appointed by elected officials like mayors that want to cater to popular regressive beliefs. (2) Local governments are unlikely to enforce or implement federally-mandated laws requiring progressive action be taken, like allowing for girls to go to school, since there’s likely to be substantial pushback within these communities internally to the implementation of such progressive laws that are often seen as being anti-religious. (3) Opposition parties are likely to run on platforms that demonize incumbent parties for their support of progressive yet unpopular legislation, which is likely to be politically persuasive given the lack of change in social attitudes on their side and the government’s apparent betrayal of the popular will. In cases where these opposition parties get elected, they’re likely to gut funding for progressive programs, roll back progressive regulations, and repeal progressive pieces of legislation, and even when these parties don’t get elected, there’s more of an incentive for incumbent candidates to backtrack on their support for controversial, progressive policies in order to seem more moderate and palatable. These three mechanisms prove that social buy-in is a necessary prerequisite to effective legal reform: laws are, fundamentally, just words on a page, and need buy-in from local communities to have any efficacy. That buy-in only happens on our side, when there’s pressure from social movements to shift societal attitudes in a progressive direction, thus allowing for progressive legislation to flourish and be more effective under our side. The conclusion here is that legal reform does nothing without accompanying reforms in social attitudes: even if schools for young girls exist, few will attend if there’s a credible fear of being assaulted while on the bus ride in. Even if gay marriage is officially legalized, few will [sentence unfinished in the original]
Third, shifting attitudes engenders longer-term change than reforming laws. Note that developing nations are economically fragile, which allows for volatile swings in political power as governments oscillate between different populist movements catering to the widespread sense of desperation borne out of socioeconomic deprivation. As a consequence, even when laws get reformed on their side, it’s likely those laws get repealed or watered down in the future. The structural reason for this is that as populist swings seize developing nations, there’s an incentive for governments to oppose the measures put in place by prior administrations, since populists are often heavily anti-establishment and weaponize people’s frustration with incumbent government. All of this means that even if GOV can demonstrate they get substantial legal reform on their side, that’s likely to be a short-term victory given unpredictable shifts in political power that are far beyond the control of social movements. Comparatively, it’s easier to change social attitudes for two reasons: (1) Once individuals are made aware of the suffering faced by marginalized groups, they’re likely to feel an empathetic sense of duty to reduce that suffering because humans have a fundamental biological aversion to suffering and a capacity for empathizing with the struggles and hardships of other people. Importantly, this means that when social movements fight to change attitudes, the change they get is longer lasting since people’s attitudes are less fickle than government’s policy agendas. (2) Note that as social movements change some people’s attitudes, that spreads through broader networks of people. Maybe social movements can initially convince only a small group of people to care about issues like queer rights or feminism, but as those people talk with other people––like their family, friends, coworkers, or connections on social media––progressive ideas spread through discursive mechanisms. That means that social awareness is self-amplifying on our side, whereas reforming laws is marginally beneficial given the flip-flopping that occurs within unstable developing nations
Fourth, social discrimination is likely to be a more pressing issue than legal discrimination in developing nations. The structural reason for this is that discriminatory attitudes often emerge from deeply-held cultural or religious values, which are likely to be regressive insofar as they often are based on beliefs that originated hundreds or thousands of years ago, when social attitudes were less progressive. This means that unless those underlying attitudes are changed, people will always view it as their personal, communal, or religious duty to maintain oppressive structures––not, per se, because they intrinsically are terrible people, but rather because powerful institutions like religion weaponize discriminatory sentiments to maintain power. This means that legal changes are functionally performative in nature: for instance, even when India took legal measures to reduce the caste system, dominant social norms that favored the system of social hierarchy prevailed, rendering the law ineffective and the caste system still functionally present in India, even if not officially or formally. As another example, even if laws change to become more accommodating of the queer community, there’s likely to be an uptick in vigilante violence against non-heteronormative or non-cisgender individuals since people view it as their duty––and an emotionally and spiritually powerful one at that––to take matters into their own hands when the state won’t
Fifth, legal reform is not an inherent good because it causes people, even moderates who are persuadable, to “check out” of continued reform. On our side, when people can be persuaded and convinced to change their views towards marginalized groups, there’s a feeling that dominant social norms, attitudes, and beliefs all must be overhauled, which importantly is a process which does not have a defined endpoint. That means that on our side, people feel a greater sense of duty to continue the fight for social equality, since there’s no clear point at which “equality” has been reached. Comparatively on their side, even if there’s some degree of public buy-in to legislative reforms, the fact that social movements seem to “get what they want” when the government, for instance, decriminalizing homosexuality or permitting women autonomy from their spouses, people “check out” of the movement and don’t continue in the fight for social change. That means, importantly, that our side is able to co-opt many of GOV’s benefits insofar as shifting social perceptions, in the long run, also shifts the sort of legislation that’s palatable for politicians to support, but we also gain the benefit of galvanizing individual people to combat not just legal, but also social, forms of oppression since they feel a greater sense of duty to combat a (social) problem that has no clearly defined endpoint
The conclusion of this argument is that, even if we concede it’s just as easy to fight for legal change as it is to fight for attitudinal change, in practice, it’s preferable to change the latter
Second argument: Why is it structurally easier to change attitudes and beliefs than to change laws and policies?
Three tiers to this claim
First tier: why is it nearly impossible for social movements in developing nations to bargain for changes in laws?
One, governments are often quite corrupt because (1) government salaries are quite low, especially in developing economies where the economy is cash-strapped, which predisposes government officials towards accepting bribes from powerful institutions in society that benefit from existing power structures and therefore have an incentive to oppose progressive legislative reform, and (2) the post-conflict and post-colonial nature of many of these states means that the existence of a dominant ethnic group, like Hindus in India or Hutus in Rwanda, de facto guarantees the electoral success of a particular party, like the AKP in Turkey or Modi’s BJP in India, which means that politicians have minimal incentives to be accountable and instead have interests in solidifying preexisting social hierarchies that reinforce their own power. This means that it’s structurally hard for these social movements to get meaningful change insofar as corruption is rampant within the state
Two, governments in developing nations are often subject to enormous amounts of corporate capture, because foreign MNCs have a vested interest in accessing cheap labor markets or valuable natural resources from these countries, thus prompting them to lobby, bribe, and selectively fund the campaigns of politicians with pro-corporate policy agendas. Given that these companies are themselves dominated by institutions of privilege, they’re likely to push governments against implementing social reforms
Three, social movements often lack widespread political capital since they’re often nascent, lacking buy-in, and small in scope at their outset. This is true on both sides, but it’s worse on theirs: while an individual person’s beliefs can be changed through persuasion, persistent advocacy, and reasonable discourse, a government is subject to enormous lobbying pressure from many different interest groups, which means that it’s structurally hard for cash-strapped social organizations with finite amounts of political capital to influence the state
Four, governments have incentives to establish minimum voting coalitions to guarantee electoral success, which means they often cater exclusively to majority demographics that don’t represent or directly understand the plight of marginalized or oppressed communities, and if anything, actively benefit from systems of discrimination. This means that it’s structurally unlikely governments can ever get on-board with changing laws in a progressive direction because doing so would be politically unpopular with their majority-based electoral constituency
Five, either developing governments are subject to volatile swings in political power, in which case the reforms implemented by social movements are fleeting and non-durable, or a single dominant political dynasty exists, such as in Kenya, in which case there’s little ability to change government policy because there’s no viable opposition threat
Second tier: given that it’s structurally difficult to change governmental policies, why is it easier to change individual people’s beliefs?
One, there’s a lower bar involved in changing individual people’s attitudes. Government policies are informed by a wide range of political factors, whereas individuals tend to think about their own beliefs far less deeply and are thus more open to having their views changed; this is where social movements come in our side
Two, even if we can’t immediately shift social attitudes on our side, attempts at doing so gradually shift the Overton window in a way that makes future social attitudes more progressive
Three, the rise of social media provides a unique opportunity for social movements to spread awareness and increase societal dialogue about the important issues facing marginalized communities
Four, even in cases where socially discriminatory attitudes exist due to forces like religion, social movements can embrace cultural or religious forces in their advocacy! For instance, feminists in Muslim-majority developing countries can push for feminist interpretations of the Quran. The reason this strategy is likely to work is that it allows social movements to exploit what people already believe to be true, then use that “truth” to demonstrate to people why they ought to support progressive values
Five, there’s often limitations on the ability of foreign agents to directly interfere with things like political lobbying or elections, but there are rarely such restrictions on general advocacy, which means that on our side, it’s easier for international organizations to contribute to on-the-ground attitudinal advocacy campaigns
Third tier: why do you get greater buy-in to social movements in developing nations under our side?
One, recognize that many developing countries are post-colonial, and importantly, when nations transition away from colonialism, newly formed governments are often widely popular for four broad reasons: (1) They’re often formed by widely popular revolutionary or political leaders, e.g. Gandhi leading the charge for Indian independence or Nelson Mandela being the face of equality within South Africa in the fight against apartheid. (2) Since these regimes often emerge post-conflict or post-separation from colonial powers, governments are often formed by the wide-scale, broad movements that were necessary to topple autocratic or imperialist forces, which thus means there’s substantial support for initial governments. (3) It’s often the case that new governments, when they’re first put into power, know that some people on the margins might be skeptical of their newly-granted power, so nascent governments in developing nations often engage in deliberately popular activities, like investing heavily into social welfare. (4) New governments are perceived as being figureheads and the culmination of anti-colonial resistance movements, which is widely popular given the brutal legacy of Western imperialism. Given that these governments tend to be highly popular, when social movements explicitly advocate against existing policies put in place by governments, they’re likely to (1) face massive retaliation even from members of the general public since they’re perceived as going against the will of a government that is widely regarded as popular, and (2) social movements are likely to be brandished with the title of being “pro-Western” or “pro-colonialism” on their side, when they’re seen as actively fighting against governments whose explicit mandate coming into office is to eradicate the legacy of colonialism. This critique might be made on both sides (i.e. feminism being Western-centric, for instance) but the attack seems more credible on their side
Two, governments are more likely to crack down on social movements when those movements are seen as undermining the public credibility of the incumbent regime and questioning the legitimacy of current policy. Even though social movements also advocate for change on our side, the way that change is likely to be messaged is different: when a movement pushes for legal reform, the message is inherently adversarial, e.g. certain laws are discriminatory and therefore must be repealed, whereas on our side, advocacy narratives are more likely to emphasize notions of reinterpreting scripture or restructuring the way people think about engaging with their religion, culture, or traditional social norms